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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a remarkable diversity in the nature and origin of immunity rules. Some of these
rules are created at common law, some by statute, and some under the Constitution. In
general, there has been an increased hostility to absolute immunity with the passage of time.
Thus, many personal imfnunities, such as those that bar suits between spouses, between
child and parent, or against charities, have been abandoned or are now in the process of
contraction, if not disintegration. Governmental and official immunities are more problem-
atic.I
Ohio courts have exhibited an antagonism toward the plethora of immunities
which have accumulated from years of judicial precedent. Over the years, the Ohio
Supreme Court has abolished interspousal immunity, 2 parental immunity, 3 charitable
immunity, 4 and local governmental immunity.5
In Reynolds v. State,6 the Ohio Supreme Court fashioned a seemingly paradox-
ical majority opinion. On the one hand, the opinion symbolized the continuing
commitment to limit immunities by expanding the state's tort liability. At the same
time, however, the court restricted the type of claims against the state that are
amenable to suit.
The plaintiff in Reynolds sought damages for injuries resulting in her complete
paralysis after being brutally raped and assaulted. 7 At the time of the attack, the
assailant, a convict, was on a statutorily-authorized work furlough from prison. 8 The
statute allows "trustworthy prisoners" to be released while they are pursuing
approved educational or employment opportunities. 9 It also provides, however, that
a furloughed prisoner "shall be confined for any period of time that he is not
[engaged in] his approved. . . program."' 0
1. R. ErnrmN, C. GREGORY & H. KLIN, CASES AND MATErLAuLs ON TORTS 839 (4th ed. 1984).
2. Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985).
3. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
4. Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Ass'n for Child Dev., 12 Ohio St. 3d 210, 466 N.E.2d 867 (1984).
5. Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228 (1983); see generally
Cclebrezze & Hull, The Rise and Fall of Sovereign Immunity in Ohio, 32 Cmv. Sr. L. REv. 367 (1983) (tracing the
acceptance and abrogation of immunity for municipal corporations); but see OHIo Rsv. CODE ANN. §§ 2744.01-.09
(Anderson Supp. 1986) (restored limited immunity to political subdivisions).
6. 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 471 N.E.2d 776 (1984).
7. Id.
8. Id.; see OHio REv. CODE Ams. § 2967.26 (Anderson 1987). This statute reads in part:
The adult parole authority may grant furloughs to trustworthy prisoners, other than those serving a sentence of
imprisonment for life imposed for an offense committed on or after October 19, 1981, who are confined in any
state penal or reformatory institution for the purpose of employment, vocational training, educational programs,
or other programs designated by the director of rehabilitation and correction within this state. No prisoner who
is serving a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed for an offense committed on or after October 19, 1981
shall be granted a furlough.
A prisoner who is granted a furlough pursuant to this section shall be confined for any periods of time that he
is not actually working at his approved employment or engaged in a vocational training or other educational
program.
9. Id.
10. Id. The specific statutory duty of confinement distinguishes this case from those cases in other jurisdictions
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The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint against the state for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The appellate court subsequently
affirmed the trial court. 1 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, maintaining that
individuals may hold the state liable for personal injuries proximately caused by the
state's failure to adequately monitor prisoners in the furlough program.' 2 The
significance of the Reynolds decision is twofold. First, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that a statutory duty to confine furloughed inmates creates, on the part of the state,
a clear obligation that runs to individual members of the public. Second, the court
held that discretionary acts by state officials are expressly protected from tort liability
by the Court of Claims Act.
This Note will begin by examining the historical evolution of sovereign
immunity followed by a discussion of the current federal and Ohio statutes that limit
the doctrine.13 By addressing the dissent's major challenges to the Reynolds decision,
this Note will endorse the imposition of liability upon the state, pursuant to a statutory
duty. 14 This Note, however, questions the reasoning used by the majority in finding
a "discretionary exception" in the state's waiver of immunity statute. '5 Finally, this
Note will propose an alternative method of calculating meritorius claims in the face
of competing policy considerations. 16
II. BACKGROUND OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Conceptual Development
Sovereign immunity' 7 is traced to the English concept that "the king can do no
wrong."' 18 Although the origin of the phrase is largely unsettled, by 1268 the
principle that the king could not be sued eo nomine in his own courts without his
consent was widely accepted.' 9 However, this immunity was purely personal in
nature and did not attach to the government as a whole.20 Claims affecting the king
could be judicially maintained when the suit named one of the king's officers as a
party to the action, rather than the Crown itself.2' Furthermore, equitable relief
against the Crown was available in the Court of Exchequer.22 Even legal relief was
where the state was excused from liability for the actions of temporarily released inmates. See LeBlanc v. State, 393 So.
2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 394 So. 2d 1235 (La. 1980); Scochemaro v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 543, 165
N.Y.S.2d 609 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1957).
11. Reynolds v. State, No. 83AP-348, slip op. at 2799 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1983), rev'd, 14 Ohio
St. 3d 68, 471 N.E. 2d 776 (1984).
12. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 70, 471 N.E.2d 776, 778-79 (1984).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part 11.
15. See infra Part Ill(D).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. For the purpose of this Note, "governmental immunity" and "sovereign immunity" are synonymous and will
be used interchangeably,
18. W. KEErON, D. DOBBS, R. KEroN & D. OwEN, PRossE AND KEaroV ON THE LAw op TORTS, § 316, p. 1033 (5th
ed. 1984).
19. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1963).
20. Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant 12 (Series XLV, No. 1) (1927).
21. Jaffe, supra note 19, at 1.
22. See Pawlett v. Attorney Gen., 145 Eng. Rep. 550, 552 (1668).
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routinely available in suits pursued against the Crown eo nomine when consent and
authorization to sue were obtained by petition of right, as opposed to the issuance of
a writ. 23 Yet this formalistic requirement of consent did not necessarily imply the
superiority of the king over the law. 24 Indeed, Bracton, an early commentator and
legal historian, stated that "[t]he law makes the king, therefore, the king must make
a return present to the law by subjecting himself to its rules.-25 Thus, it appears that
the expression "the king can do no wrong" originally meant precisely the opposite
of what it later came to mean. The expression initially signified that "the King must
not, was not allowed, not entitled to do wrong .... 26 As the California Supreme
Court concluded:
At the earliest common law the doctrine of "sovereign immunity" . . . began as the
personal prerogative of the king, gained impetus from sixteenth century metaphysical
concepts, may have been based on the misreading of an ancient maxim, and only rarely had
the effect of completely denying compensation. How it became in the United States the basis
for a rule that the federal and state governments did not have to answer for their torts has
been called "one of the mysteries of legal evolution.'27
The maxim evolved into its present-day meaning over several centuries.
Blackstone noted that "no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil
matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction implies
superiority of power .... "28 The early English case of Russell v. Men of Devon29
is often cited as the forerunner of the present-day doctrine. In Russell, the court
denied a farmer recovery when his wagon was damaged while trying to cross a bridge
that was in disrepair. 30 The Russell court reasoned that an unincorporated entity was
not subject to suit and no corporate fund was available from which damages could be
paid. 3t One member of the court believed it was "better that an individual should
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer inconvenience.' '32
The United States Supreme Court at first rejected sovereign immunity for the
states. 33 Shortly thereafter, the eleventh amendment, which stripped the federal
courts of jurisdiction over any claims made against one of the states by private
individuals, was adopted. 34 Chief Justice Marshall explained the impetus behind the
amendment's ratification:
23. Jaffe, supra note 19, at I.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Schulz, Bracton on Kingship, 60 EG. Hsr. REv. 136, 168 (1945).
26. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 Y/A.E L.J. 1, 2 (1921).
27. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 214-15, 359 P.2d 457, 458-59, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90-91
(1961).
28. 1 W. Bt.ACKsTo-E, Co.%mETAIEs *235.
29. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
30. Id. at 359-60.
31. Id. at 362; see also Martin, Common Law Sovereign Immunity and the Maine Torts Claims Act: A Rose by
Another Name, 35 ME. L. REv. 265, 267 (1983).
32. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788).
33. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (The language in Article III of the United States
Constitution conferring on federal courts jurisdiction over disputes "between a State and Citizens of another State" meant
that a state could be sued without its consent.)
34. U.S. Co.-sT., amend. XI; see also Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs, 44
U. CoLo. L. Rrv. 1, 6 (1972).
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[A]t the adoption of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the
apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very
serious objection to that instrument .... [T]o quiet the apprehensions . . , this [eleventh]
amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State Legislatures.35
Mower v. Leicester36 is the first American case to expressly apply the Russell
sovereign immunity doctrine. 37 The plaintiff in Mower sued the inhabitants of the
town of Leicester for the loss of his horse, caused by the neglect of the town to keep
a bridge in repair.38 Without explaining why Russell was applicable to Mower, the
court simply concluded that "the reasoning there is conclusive against the action."39
Less than ten years after Mower, the United States Supreme Court admitted the
entrenchment of sovereign immunity on the federal level when they wrote that "[t]he
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against
the United States .... ,,40 This view persisted well into the twentieth century. Justice
Holmes explained the premise upon which this view was based: "A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends." 41 The modem view of sovereign
immunity, as explained by Justice Holmes, soon became firmly established in
American jurisprudence, preventing legal actions against both the federal and state
governments. 42
To mitigate the harsh results of immunity, Congress frequently found it
necessary to consider private bills to compensate individuals for injuries resulting
from the federal government's negligent conduct. 43 In 1939, the United States
Supreme Court noted the growing societal dissatisfaction with governmental immu-
nity. 44 Thus, the deluge of private congressional bills for relief,45 increasing public
sentiment for greater governmental responsibility, 46 and persistent scholarly criti-
cism, 47 persuaded Congress to take action in the area of governmental tort immunity.
35. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821).
36. 9 Mass. 247 (1812). Cf. Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977).
37. Martin, supra note 31, at 267; but cf. Black v. Rempublicamn, 1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792); Commonwealth v.
Colqhouns, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M) 213 (1808).
38. Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 250 (1812).
39. Id.
40. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
41. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
42. Hall, Sovereign Immunity and Reemergence of the GovernmentallProprietary Distinction: A Setback in Idaho's
Governmental Liability Law, 20 IDAHO L. REv. 197, 202 (1984).
43. Gellhom & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 CoLni. L. REv. 722, 723 (1947); see
also Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States 1790-1955, 1966 U. Ii.. L.F. 795, 800
n.25.
44. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 391 (1939).
45. Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Mmu. L. REv. 751, 831 n.23; see supra text accompanying
note 43.
46. Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor has No Clothes, 1966 U. IL.. L.F. 828, 832.
47. See, e.g., Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 YAE L.J. 1 (1924); Davis, supra note 45.
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B. Federal Tort Claims Act
In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act.48 The Act allowed
recovery in tort against the federal government "in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . ,49 The Act provided a
number of exceptions to liability: claims arising from the transmission of postal
matter;50 claims from military activities in times of war;51 and claims from intentional
torts committed by federal officials other than "investigative or law enforcement
officers." 5 2 The most important limitation in the Act excepts claims "based upon the
exercise or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty ... [by]
a federal agency or an employee . . . . 3 This limitation is commonly known as the
"discretionary exception.' '54 The Federal Tort Claims Act served as a model for the
states as they began to draft their own waiver of immunity statutes.
C. Ohio Court of Claims Act
1. Historical Evolution
Ohio embraced the doctrine of sovereign immunity as early as 1840-5 and
reaffirmed the principle consistently throughout the nineteenth century.5 6 In 1912, the
Ohio Constitution was amended to abolish the state's governmental immunity. The
1912 amendment provided that "[s]uits may be brought against the State, in such
courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law."'57
In 1917, however, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that this amendment was only
an authorization for subsequent statutes in which the General Assembly might grant
its specific consent to be sued.58 The court later explained this position:
[A]fter [the amendment] was adopted, the situation, in practical effect, was the same as
before its adoption. Although the defense of governmental immunity was not available to the
State, the defense of lack of consent by the General Assembly to such suit was available.
Thus, an action based on tort was not properly maintainable against the State of Ohio unless
it consented to such suit.59
48. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). This
Note will only examine the Federal Tort Claims Act in a general fashion insofar as it relates to the adoption of waiver of
immunity statutes by the states.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1982).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1982).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
54. Hall, supra note 42, at 206.
55. State v. Franklin Bank, 10 Ohio 91 (1840), rev'd sub nom., Franklin Branch Bank v. Ohio, 66 U.S. 474
(1862); Cf. Haverlack v. Portage Homes, 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982).
56. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ogelvee v. Cappeller, 39 Ohio St. 207 (1883); State ex rel. Parrott v. Board of Pub.
Works, 36 Ohio St. 409 (1881); Seely v. State, I1 Ohio 501 (1842), aff'd on rehearing, 12 Ohio 476 (1843).
57. Orno CoNsr., art. I, § 16.
58. Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917). Cf. Haverlack v. Portage Homes, 2 Ohio St. 3d
26, 446 N.E.2d 749 (1982).
59. Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 144, 285 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052
(1972). Cf. Haverlack v. Portage Homes, 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982).
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In 1975, the Ohio General Assembly expressly consented to be sued by creating
the Court of Claims that has jurisdiction to adjudicate virtually all claims against the
state. 60 Since the Court of Claims Act specified both the courts and the manner in
which the state was to be sued, the Ohio Supreme Court construed this Act to be the
specific consent that was lacking in the constitutional amendment adopted sixty-three
years earlier. 6t
2. Present Framework
State statutes waiving immunity have generally taken three different forms:
(1) absolute waivers; (2) limited waivers that allow only certain claims; and (3)
general waivers subject to specific exceptions. 62 Ohio's statutory waiver in the Court
60. Osio REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Anderson 1987); see also Bueger v. Office of Pub. Defender, 17 Ohio
App. 3d 29, 477 N.E.2d 1170 (1984) (Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over all tort and contract actions against
the state).
61. McCord v. Division of Parks and Recreation, 54 Ohio St. 2d 72, 375 N.E.2d 50 (1978); see also
Schenkolewski v. Metroparks Sys., 67 Ohio St. 2d 31, 426 N.E.2d 784 (1981). Cf. Haverlack v. Portage Homes, 2 Ohio
St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982).
62. Comment, Sovereign Immunity in Georgia, 27 E~ioRv L.J. 717, 750 (1978). Absolute or "blanket" waivers
completely abrogate state immunity. Limited waivers retain immunity, subject to certain exceptions, whereas general
waivers establish liability, subject to certain exceptions. A survey of states' immunity statutes revealed the following:
State waiver Type
Alabama None (immunity retained [ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14]).
Alaska General (ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1962 & Supp. 1986)).
Arizona General (Am. REv. STAT. ANN. §§12-820.01, .02 (1985 & Supp. 1986)).
Arkansas None (immunity retained [ARK. CoNsT. art.V, § 20]).
California Limited (CAL. Gov'T. Cons § 815 (West 1980)).
Colorado Limited (CoLo. Rev. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
Connecticut Limited (CONN. GE. STAT. AN. § 4-160 (West 1969 & Supp. 1987)).
Delaware Limited (DEL. COD ANN. tit. 10,§ 4001 (Supp. 1986)).
Florida General (FLA. STAT. ANN. §768.28 (West 1986)).
Georgia Limited (GA. CONsr. art. I, § 2).
Hawaii General (HAw. Rsv. STAT. §662-2 (1985 Repl.)).
Idaho Limited (IDAHO ConE § 6-903 (1983 & Supp.)).
Illinois Absolute (ILt. CoNsT. art. XII1, § 4).
Indiana General (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986)).
Iowa General (IowA Con ANN. § 25A.4 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987)).
Kansas General (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6103 (1984)).
Kentucky Limited (Ky. REv. STAT. §44.072 (Michie 1986)).
Louisiana None (immunity retained [LA. CONsT. art. x1n, § 101]).
Maine Limited (Ms. Rev. STAT. Am. tit. 14 § 8103 (1980 & Supp. 1986)).
Maryland Limited (MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-104 (1984)).
Massachusetts General (MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 258 § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op 1980 & Supp. 1987)).
Michigan Limited (Mic. Co.mp. LAws ANN. § 691.1407 (West 1987)).
Minnesota General (MomN. STAT. ANm. § 3.736 (Westl977 & Supp. 1987)).
Mississippi Limited (Mtss. Con ANm. § 11-46-5 (Supp. 1986)).
Missouri Limited (Mo. ANm. STAT. § 537.600 (Vernon 1953 & Supp. 1987)).
Montana General (Mosr. COn ANN. § 2-9-102 (1986)).
Nebraska Limited (NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-8209 (1981)).
Nevada General (NEv. REv. STAT. AN. § 41.031 (1986)).
New Hampshire None (immunity retained [N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 99-D:6 (Supp. 1985)]).
New Jersey Limited (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-1 (,Vest 1982)).
New Mexico Limited (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (1986)).
New York Absolute (N.Y. Jun. LAw § 8-12 (McKinney 1963)).
North Carolina Limited (N.C. GE. STAT. § 143-291 (1983)).
North Dakota Limited (N.D. CEr. Con § 32-12.1-15 (Supp. 1985)).
Ohio Absolute (Owo REv. COD ANN. § 2743.01 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1986)).
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of Claims Act is absolute and contains few exceptions. 63 The definitional section of
the Ohio Court of Claims Act specifically exempts political subdivisions of the state
from the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Act. 64 The only other
significant limitation to the waiver specifies that it "shall be void if ... the act or
omission was manifestly outside the scope of the officer's or employee's office or
employment or that [the officer or employee] ... acted with malicious purpose, in
bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner." 65 The Court of Claims Act is the
statutory provision that permitted the plaintiff in Reynolds to sue the state.
III. OBJECTIONS TO REYNOLDS
Governmental tort liability may encourage the state to be more careful or
efficient in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities. 66 Governmental liability
also spreads the loss over society rather than requiring the individual to bear the cost
alone.67 The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v. State implicitly advances
these policies by finding that a statutory duty to confine furloughed prisoners gives
rise to a concomitant legal duty. The majority's major premise was that a violation
of the statutory duty to confine furloughed prisoners when not in their rehabilitation
programs constituted negligence per se. 68
The dissent in Reynolds argued that the Ohio Court of Claims Act should be
narrowly interpreted,69 and made four primary objections to the majority's position:
(1) the state owed no duty to the plaintiff; (2) the action is not one that could be
brought under the Court of Claims Act; (3) the imposition of liability on the state
would be overly burdensome; and (4) no justification existed for a discretionary/
ministerial analysis. 70
Oklahoma Limited (OaA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 153 (West Supp. 1987)).
Oregon General (OR. REv. STAT. § 30.265 (1983)).
Pennsylvania Limited (PA. Coss. STAT. ANN. §§ 2310, 8522 (Purden 1986)).
Rhode Island General (R.I. GEN. Lnxvs § 9-31-1 (1985)).
South Carolina Limited (S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-20 (Law Co-op Supp. 1986)).
South Dakota Limited (S.D. Coomaw LAws ANN. § 21-32-16 (1979 & Supp. 1986)).
Tennessee Limited (TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-201 (1980 & Supp. 1986)).
Texas Limited (TEax. Civ. PRAc. & RE.M. CODE ANN. § 101.025 (Vernon 1986)).
Utah Limited (UTAh CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 (1986)).
Vermont General (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (1973)).
Virginia General (VA. CODE § 8.01-195.3 (1984 & Supp.1986)).
Washington Absolute ,VWsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1987)).
West Virginia None (immunity retained 1W. VA. CoNsr. art.VI, § 35]).
Wisconsin Limited (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (,West 1983 & Supp. 1986)).
Wyoming Limited (Vyo. STAT. § 1-35-102 (1977)).
63. See Onto REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 2743.01-.09 (Anderson 1987).
64. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.01(B) (Anderson 1987) (political subdivisions defined as municipal corporations,
townships, counties, school districts, and other governmental bodies geographically smaller than the state); see also Haas
v. City of Akron, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 364 N.E.2d 1376 (1977). Cf. Haverlack v. Portage Homes, 2 Ohio St. 3d 26,442
N.E.2d 749 (1982); but see supra note 5.
65. Ouio REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Anderson 1987).
66. See Glannon, The Scope of Public Liability Under the Tort Claims Act: Beyond the Public Duty Rule, 67 MASS.
L. REv. 159, 167 (1982); see also Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
67. Comment, supra note 62, at 742.
68. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 69, 471 N.E.2d 776, 777-78 (1984).
69. Id. at 71, 471 N.E.2d at 779 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 72-74, 471 N.E.2d at 779-81.
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A. Lack of Duty
To establish liability based on negligence for injuries to another, a duty owed to
the injured person must exist.7 1 Consequently, the dissenter's first criticism is that the
state owed no duty to the plaintiff, and a cause of action based on negligence could
not be maintained as a matter of law. 7 2 The justification for this argument rests on two
lines of reasoning: first, statutory or public duties of state employees create no cause
of action in third parties; second, because the furlough statute was not designed to
protect the public, no "special duty" to the public at large was created.
1. "Public Duty" Distinction
Courts in some jurisdictions have adopted a "public duty" rule which maintains
that a general statutory duty to the public at large creates no specific duty to an
individual member of the public. 73 This rule effectively withholds relief from injured
individuals by denying them a cause of action against a governmental unit. In Ohio,
the Franklin County Court of Appeals adopted this line of reasoning in a 1976
decision, Shelton v. Industrial Commission.74 The court in Shelton ruled that Ohio
statutes authorizing the inspection and enforcement of safety standards were meant to
protect the public generally and created no duty toward any particular person.75
Under this analysis, the confinement requirement in the furlough statute would be a
"public duty" that would not support a private cause of action against the state.
This reasoning, however, is of questionable validity. Such a restrictive "special
duty"/"public duty" dichotomy would result in a duty to none when there is, in
reality, a duty to all. 76 The artificiality of this distinction was recognized by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court when it held that "any duty owed to the public generally
is a duty owed to individual members of the public.' 77
Furthermore, such analysis is inconsistent with Ohio law. Specifically, princi-
ples of statutory construction favor an interpretation of the furlough statute that would
find the state to have a mandatory duty of confinement. An Ohio court of appeals
observed that "[i]t is a general rule that those statutory measures which are intended
for the security of the citizens ... are mandatory.' '78 There is virtually no question
that the confinement provision was intended to protect society by closely monitoring
71. See, e.g., W. KEEroN, D. DOBBS, R. KEEroN, & D. OwEN, PROSSER AND KEro ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 30, p. 164
(5th ed. 1984); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); see also Cain v. State, 14 Ohio
App. 3d 105, 470 N.E.2d 208 (1984); Stamper v. Parr-Ruckman Motor Sales, 25 Ohio St. 2d 1,265 N.E.2d 785 (1971).
72. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 72-73, 471 N.E.2d 776 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., McGeorge v. City of Phoenix, 117 Ariz. 272, 572 P.2d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Quintano v.
Industrial Comm'n, 29 Colo. App. 319, 485 P.2d 733 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137
(1972); Cheney v. Dade County, 353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. App.
1980).
74. 51 Ohio App. 2d 125, 367 N.E.2d 51 (1976).
75. Id. at 131, 367 N.E.2d at 54.
76. See, e.g., Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979); Dinsky v.
Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 809, 438 N.E.2d 51, 55 (1982).
77. Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 540, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (1976).
78. Woodmansee v. Cockerill, 115 Ohio App. 409, 415, 185 N.E.2d 439, 443 (1961).
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all furloughed prisoners. 79 In addition, the interpretation of language, analogous to
that contained in the Court of Claims Act, compels a similar result. The Ohio
Supreme Court recently ruled that municipal corporations owe a special duty to
individuals. 80 This duty was created by a state statute that read: "Municipal
corporations ... shall cause [roads, bridges, alleys, sidewalks] to be kept open, in
repair, and free from nuisance." ' The confinement provision from which the
statutory duty in Reynolds arises is identical to the above statute in its use of the
imperative word "shall." This confinement provision reads: "A prisoner who is
granted a furlough ... shall be confined .. -82 The Ohio Supreme Court has
consistently held that the word "shall" generally makes a statutory provision
mandatory. 83 Based upon this statutory construction, both statutes cited above create
a "special duty" to each member of the public at large. Both statutes prescribe
affirmative, governmental duties to which the judiciary should give effect.
2. Purpose of the Furlough Statute
As a general proposition, a plaintiff may establish a statutory special duty only
if the plaintiff is a member of a class that the statute was intended to protect. 84
Although the primary purpose of the furlough statute was rehabilitation through a
partial release program, 85 the statute clearly evinces a strong concern for the
protection of society by requiring confinement of the prisoners when outside their
rehabilitation program. 86 Such confinement clearly was intended to prevent any
additional criminal acts by the prisoner while on furlough.
The rape and assault perpetrated against the plaintiff in Reynolds is the very type
of injury the confinement requirement was designed to prevent. Therefore, the
plaintiff would qualify as an intended beneficiary of protection under the statute.
This, in turn, would demonstrate the existence of a special duty flowing from the state
toward the plaintiff.
B. "Private Parties" Restriction
Even if the furlough statute does impose a duty upon the state, a plaintiff cannot
get relief unless the Court of Claims Act allows it. Prior to the decision in Reynolds,
the Court of Claims Act was interpreted to preclude a cause of action that did not exist
between private parties prior to the adoption of the Act.8 7 The Act states: "The State
79. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
80. Dickerhoof v. City of Canton, 6 Ohio St. 3d 128, 131, 451 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (1983); see also Strohofer v.
City of Cincinnati, 6 Ohio St. 3d 118, 121, 451 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1983).
81. OHIRo lv. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (Anderson 1987) (emphasis added).
82. Onio REv. CoDE AN-4. § 2967.26 (Anderson 1987) (emphasis added).
83. Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St. 2d 102, 107, 271 N.E.2d 834, 837 (1971); Dennison v.
Dennison, 165 Ohio St. 146, 149, 134 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1956).
84. Rankel v. City of New York, 282 A.D. 173, 177, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489 (1953), aff'd, 286 A.D. 1101, 145
N.Y.S.2d 729 (1955); see also Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. Phillips, 81 Ohio St. 453, 459-60, 91 N.E. 118, 119 (1910);
Marsh v. Koons, 78 Ohio St. 68, 73-74, 84 N.E. 599, 600-01 (1908).
85. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 73, 471 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1984) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 69, 471 N.E.2d 776, 777 (1984).
87. Ross v. Shoemaker, 3 Ohio App. 3d 31, 443 N.E.2d 1025, 1026 (1981).
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hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its
liability determined in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with
the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties." 88 The dissent in
Reynolds urged that relief for the plaintiff should be unavailable because the action
could not "have been brought by private parties inasmuch as such parties do not have
the right, duty, or program to incarcerate, parole, or partially release criminals as
does the state." 89
The dissenter's reasoning attempts to construe the phrase "same rules of law
applicable to suits between private parties" as meaning "same activities in which
private parties participate." The dissent's argument assumes that the "private
parties" restriction is jurisdictional in nature. Such a presumption is unwarranted.
Imposition of the dissenter's rationale would mean that because private individuals
perform no governmental functions, the state would be liable only for activities it
conducted concurrently with private parties. Such a limited reading would essentially
emasculate the Act and re-establish the immunity of the state-the complete
antithesis of what the general assembly intended in passing the Court of Claims Act.
Instead, the phrase "same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties"
should be construed as describing the procedures the Court of Claims will use in
evaluating complaints. Such an interpretation would require that the procedural rules
utilized in private litigation be used when the state is a party to the suit as well.
Another equally plausible interpretation, consistent with the Ohio General
Assembly's intent, was introduced by a California district court in construing similar
language in the Federal Tort Claims Act.90 Under this construction, the phrase would
be interpreted to mean that Ohio gives its consent "to be treated by the injured party
as if it were a private individual, amenable to court action without claim of
immunity ... where the negligence of its agents ... has caused injury or damage to
third parties." 9'
C. Financial Burden of Liability
Theoretically, it is not the province of the judiciary to formulate public policy
through a cost/benefit analysis:92
[T]here is nothing to prevent [the general assembly] from ... abolishling] immunity in any
respect desired, however broad that may be and whatever effects it would have upon the
financial condition of the state and the amount of taxes which citizens must pay for claims
created by an unlimited waiver of liability. 93
Realistically, however, financial considerations may be an appropriate factor for
courts to consider in certain cases.
88. OHlo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Anderson 1987).
89. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 73, 471 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1984) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
90. Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
91. Id. at 833.
92. See Shelton v. Tucker, 51 Ohio App. 2d 125, 131, 367 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1976).
93. Id.
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Although more expansive liability may cost more than immunity, the alternative
is the placement of an inordinate financial burden upon the innocent injured party. 94
If the state finds a certain policy to be advantageous, such as penal rehabilitation
through a furlough program, it is only equitable to expect the state to bear the
consequential damages resulting from negligent implementation. Because rehabilita-
tion presumably benefits all state taxpayers, the misfortune of an injured party
should similarly be shared by all state taxpayers. 95 Furthermore, private corporate
enterprises have managed to operate successfully despite their exposure to tort
liabilities. It is difficult to perceive why public entities would face a more severe
hardship. 96 The experience of New York indicates that an expansive waiver of state
immunity created no intolerable burden on its economy. 97 Indeed, the initial absolute
waiver of immunity in Ohio demonstrates the speciousness of this argument when
contrasted against the potential increase in liability that the state will face under
Reynolds. There is little reason to believe that the decision in Reynolds will cause
Ohio any significant additional financial burdens.
Even if claims made upon the state were to outstrip all available resources, the
Ohio General Assembly could simply enact appropriate legislation to correct the
problem. For example, many states have placed a limit on the recovery amount
available to plaintiffs98 or have retained immunity for certain critical areas of state
conduct99 while still meeting the general policy objectives outlined earlier.
94. See Comment, supra note 62, at 742. But cf. Kelley, The Need for State Immunity from Suit, 1983 DEr. C.L.
REv. 1321.
95. Van Alystyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 921.
96. Id.
97. McDonald. The Administration of a Tort Liability Law in New York- 9 LAw & Coms-'. PRoes. 262, 280 (1942).
98. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-10-114 (1982 & Supp. 1986) ($150,000 per claimant, $450,000 per occurrence or
up to insurance coverage limits); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West 1986) ($ I00,000 per person, $200,000 per occurrence);
GA. Co. T. art. 1, § 2 (limited to extent of insurance coverage); IDAHo CODE § 6-926 (1983 & Supp. 1986) ($500,000 per
occurrence); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1986) ($100,000 per claimant); IND. CoDE ANN.
§ 34-4-16.5-4 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986) (S300,000 per person, $5 million per occurrence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105
(1984) ($500,000 per occurrence); Ky. REv. STAT. § 44.070 (Michie 1986) ($100,000 per claimant, $250,000 per
occurrence); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8105 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986) ($300,000 per occurrence); MAss. ANm. LAws
ch. 258, § 2 (Michie/Law Coop. 1980 & Supp. 1986) (S100,000 per occurrence); Mm. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West 1977
& Supp. 1987) ($200,000 per claimant, $600,000 per occurrence); Miss. CODE Am. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 1986) ($500,000
per occurrence); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.610 (Vernon 1953 & Supp. 1987) ($100,000 per claimant, $800,000 per
occurrence); NEv. REV. STAT. Aim. § 41.035 (Michie 1986) ($50,000 per claimant); N.M. STAT. ANm. § 41-4-19 (1986)
($300,000 per claimant, $500,000 per occurrence); N.C. GE. STAT. § 143-291 (1983) ($100,000 per claimant); N.D.
CEr. CoDE § 32-12.1-15 (Supp. 1985) (limited to extent of insurance coverage); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154 (West
Supp. 1987) ($200,000 per person, $1 million per occurrence); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.270 (1983) ($100,000 per
person, $300,000 per occurrence); R.I. GE. LAw § 9-31-2 (1985) ($100,000 per occurrence); S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-78-120 (Law Co-op Supp. 1986) ($250,000 per claimant, $500,000 per occurrence); S.D. CoDiFiED LAws Aim. §
21-32-15 (1979 & Supp. 1986) (limited to extent of insurance coverage); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & R m. CODE Aim. § 101.023
(Vernon 1986) ($250,000 per person, $500,000 per occurrence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (1973 & Supp. 1986)
($75,000 per person, S300,000 per occurrence); VA. CoDE § 8.01-195.3 (1984 & Supp. 1986) ($25,000 per claimant);
Vis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (Vest 1983 & Supp. 1986) ($50,000 per claimant); Wyo. STAT. § 1-35-102 (1977) (limited
to extent of insurance coverage). But see Pfost v. State, 42 Mont. 1957, 713 P.2d 495 (1985) (statutory limitations on
tort damages against the state violated the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitution).
99. See, e.g., INDn. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(3) (West 1983 & Supp. 1986) (retaining immunity for damages from
weather conditions on a public way); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736(3[1]) (1977 & Supp. 1987) (retaining immunity for losses
sustained by a patient or inmate in a state institution); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 11-46-90) (1972 & Supp. 1986) (retaining
immunity for imposition of a quarantine); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-78-60(a)(21) (Law Co-op Supp. 1986) (retaining
immunity for decisions to release or furlough persons in governmental custody); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602(2) (1973)
(retaining immunity for claims arising from assessment or collection of taxes).
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Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court ruling that the state was liable to the plaintiff in
Reynolds was an appropriate interpretation of Ohio law. However, the majority's
analysis seems strained in attempting to limit the potential scope of future liability by
reading a "discretionary exception" into the language of the Court of Claims Act.
D. Discretionary Exception
The Ohio Supreme Court defined the newly adopted "discretionary exception"
as an exemption from liability "for legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of
an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision
which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or
discretion. ' ' 100 Although this discretionary exception and its interpretation did not
forestall the state's liability in Reynolds, it is likely to have a significant impact on
future cases. '0 '
The traditional rationale for a discretionary exception is the proper distribution
of power. A discretionary exception promotes the separation of powers by removing
legislative policymaking and executive implementation of such policy from interfer-
ence by courts and juries. 102 Thus, the discretionary exception allows the legislative
and executive branches of government to formulate and implement preferred policy
decisions, while the judiciary merely interprets what the legislature has enacted. It
has been held that a contrary result would "obstruct normal governmental operations
and.., place in inexpert hands what the Legislature has seen fit to entrust to
experts."103 A related justification is the need to assure the necessary freedom for
innovative and courageous decision-making by legislative and executive officials
without the threat of a lawsuit. As Judge Learned Hand commented: "[I]t has been
thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."t14
Many states explicitly exempt discretionary acts performed by state officials
from their waiver of immunity statutes.10 5 For example, language in the Kansas Tort
Claims Act'0 6 exempts claims for damages "based on the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
100. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 70, 471 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1984).
101. See, e.g., Applegate v. Ohio Dept. of Agric., 19 Ohio App. 3d 221, 483 N.E.2d 221 (1984) (statutory duty
to issue a license is ruled discretionary and thus immune).
102. Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
103. Id. at 586, 167 N.E.2d at 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
104. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
105. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1962 & Supp. 1986); Asiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-S20.01 (Supp. 1986); CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1980); DE. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4001 (Supp. 1986); HAw. REv. STAT. § 662-125(1) (1976 &
Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (1979 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(6) (Vest 1983 & Supp. 1986);
lowA Coos ANN. § 25A.14(1) (West 1978 & Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(d) (1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 8103(2-c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 258, § 10 (Michie/Law Co-op 1980 & Supp. 1986);
MoN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736(subdiv. 3[b]) (West 1977 & Supp. 1987); Miss. CooE ANN. § 11-46-9(c) (Supp. 1986); NEa.
REv. STAT. § 81-8219(a) (1981); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.032(2) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3 ("Vest 1982); Oka.A.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(5) (West Supp. 1987); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.265(3-c) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5)
(Law. Co-op Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(1) (1980 & Supp. 1986); Tsx Civ. PRAC. & Rmi. CoD AN. §
101.056 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(a) (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602(l) (1973).
106. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6101-18 (1984).
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governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion be abused." 1 0 7 There
is no analogous express provision in the Ohio Court of Claims Act.108 Although
substantial case law exists in other jurisdictions to justify implying such an exception
in the absence of express language, 0 9 the majority in Reynolds opted to construe the
"private parties" restriction in the Act as a clear legislative desire to exempt
discretionary conduct."t 0 Thus, the court did not have to imply a discretionary
exception. Unfortunately, however, the court failed to adequately explain how future
state conduct should be analyzed in order to exempt it as discretionary. The dissent
was correct when it criticized the majority for providing little justification in
"differentiating between the discretionary decision-making process of granting
parole, and the ministerial operation of keeping the parolee confined when not
engaged in work or educational programs.""'I
Ever since the Federal Tort Claims Act first used the word,"12 courts have had
difficulty in formulating a consistent definition of "discretionary."" 3 As one Ohio
Supreme Court justice remarked, "No reported decision has been found which does
more than set slippery standards in this area."'14 Despite these ambiguities, three
distinct approaches have emerged to define discretionary state action: (1) the semantic
approach; (2) the "Good Samaritan" test; and (3) the planning-operational distinc-
tion. 115
1. Semantic Approach
The first approach focuses on a dictionary or semantic definition of the term.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "discretionary acts" as "[t]hose acts wherein there
is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that one must or must not take." 116
The application of the semantic approach results in a broad interpretation of the
"discretionary exception."" 7 For example, in Dalehite v. United States," 8 the
federal government was sued for injuries and deaths resulting from explosions of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer that was being prepared for export overseas. 19 The
107. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(d) (1984).
108. See Oaio REy. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (Anderson 1987); see also Adamov v. State, 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 9, 345
N.E.2d 661, 666 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (no discretionary exception in the Ohio Court of Claims Act).
109. See, e.g., Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Hoy v. Cappelli,
48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965);
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
110. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 70, 471 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1984). The court wrote: "The language
... that 'the state' shall 'have its liability determined ... in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits
between private parties . . . ' means that a state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions. ... Id.
Ill. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 73, 471 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1984) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
112. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
113. Note, Sovereign Immunity and the Discretionary Function Exception of the Alaska Tort Claims Act, 2 ALAsKA
L. REv. 99, 104 (1985).
114. Enghauser Mfg. v. Eriksson Engr., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 38, 451 N.E.2d 228, 234 (1983) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
115. Reynolds, The Discretionary Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 Gro. L.J. 81, 108-10 (1968-69).
116. Bmcr's LAw DicInomRy 419 (5th ed. 1979).
117. Note, supra note 113, at 104.
118. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
119. Id.
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United States Supreme Court denied recovery because of the discretionary exception
in the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court held that the exception excused both the
initiation and implementation of governmental programs.1 20
In defining the discretionary exception, the semantic approach is too broad
because almost all governmental activities are characterized by some degree of
discretion or choice, thereby excusing them from judicial review.' 2'
2. The "Good Samaritan" Approach
The second approach imposes a non-discretionary duty of due care on the
government. The "Good Samaritan" approach is best illustrated by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Indian Towing Co. v. United States. 22 In Indian
Towing, the Court found that the federal government was negligent in the operation
of a lighthouse. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Coast Guard was protected in
its original decision to operate a lighthouse for the safety of shippers. 123 However, the
Court also concluded that since shippers relied on the Coast Guard for this service,
the Coast Guard was obligated to exercise due care in operating the lighthouse.124
The "Good Samaritan" test imposes a much narrower application of the discre-
tionary exception than the semantic approach. 25 This standard also approaches a
more equitable resolution of liability than does the semantic standard. For example,
if the "Good Samaritan" test had been utilized in Dalehite, the government would
have been responsible to exercise due care in its handling of ammonium nitrate,
although the original discretionary decision to ship the fertilizer overseas still would
remain protected. This was the approach utilized by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Reynolds. The Reynolds court maintained that the state was not liable for its initial
decision to furlough a prisoner, but once that decision had been made, the state was
obligated to execute its policies in a prudent fashion.' 26
This view of immunity, however, only removes initial governmental decisions
from review; it does not extend immunity to lower, intermediate levels of decision
making when bona fide policy making has been committed to such levels. 127 Thus,
with its focus on the level of questioned decision making, this test can often be too
restrictive in its application.
3. The "Planning-Operational" Approach
Neither the "Good Samaritan" test nor the semantic test provides a useful
framework for defining a state's discretionary conduct. 28 The planning-operational
120. Id. at 35-36.
121. See infra note 128 and accompanying text; see also Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1967).
122. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
123. Id. at 69.
124. Id.
125. Reynolds, supra note 115, at 127-28.
126. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 70, 471 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1984).
127. Note, supra note 113, at 106.
128. Id. at 107.
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distinction129 has also been utilized to define the extent of the discretionary exception.
This approach classifies as discretionary all authorized governmental activities that are
based on the evaluation of basic policy factors irrespective of the level of decision
making.' 30 One court explained:
The planning level notion refers to decisions involving questions of policy, that is, the
evaluation of factors such as the financial, political, economic and social effects of a given
plan or policy .... The operations level decision, on the other hand, involves decisions
relating to the normal day-by-day operations of the government. Decisions made at this level
may involve the exercise of discretion, but not the evaluation of policy factors.' 31
The planning-operational test distinguishes between those decisions that are basic
policy determinations and those that simply implement policy. Thus, liability under
this test is tied to an examination of the circumstances surrounding the questioned
conduct. A judicial inquiry establishes whether the conduct was in fact dependent
upon an evaluation of basic policy factors. 132
Unfortunately, this test has also proven inadequate because of the difficulty in
its application. 33 For example, one court noted that:
It is not a sufficient defense for the government merely to point out that some decisionmak-
ing power was exercised by the official whose act was questioned. Answering these
questions ... is not aided by importation of the planning stage-operational stage
standard .... Such a distinction is specious. It may be a makeweight in easy cases where
of course it is not needed, but in difficult cases it proves to be another example of a distiction
"so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate
formulation."134
The court held that the use of such conclusory labels served only to substitute a
confusing set of standards for the ambiguities of the statute. ' 35
IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR OHIO
Because no express statutory language mandating the use of a "discretionary"
analysis exists, the Ohio Supreme Court could seek a more pragmatic approach to
distinguish exempt state conduct. The essential question is whether the activities in
question should be excluded from judicial review in order to serve the ultimate
purpose of a discretionary exception-protecting the separation of powers. Absolute
immunity should be accorded the state only when a suit threatens its ability to
129. The planning-operational test is virtually identical to the discretionary-ministerial dichotomy utilized by some
Courts.
130. Note, supra note 113, at 108.
131. Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
132. Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Function Exception Revisited, 31 U. MANH L.
REv. 161, 189 (1976).
133. See Payton v. United States. 636 F.2d 132, 137-38 (1981), rev'd in part on rehearing, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.
1982),
134. Smithv. United States, 375 F.2d243,246(5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Frankfurter, J.,in IndianTowing Co. v. United
States).
135. Id.
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govern.136 To best fulfill this purpose without unduly hindering the opportunity for
injured individuals to recover just compensation from the state, a two-pronged
approach might be employed to achieve an equitable yet realistic solution. At the first
level, absolute immunity would be accorded to the legislative and judicial branches
of state government. This would wholly insulate the legislature and state judiciary
from suit. At the second level, the majority of state actions, including administrative
decisions that are often labelled quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative, would be
evaluated through a detailed interest analysis. 137 On the one hand, the court should
consider the interests of the injured party, including the nature of the loss sustained,
the expectations and reliance held by the injured party, and the availability of
alternative remedies. 138 Alternatively, the court should balance these interests against
the state's interests, including the nature of the governmental activity involved, the
level at which the activity was undertaken, the political or policy overtones
implicated, and the burden that liability would place on the state. 139 This approach
holds the distinct advantage of allowing the court to facilitate the purposes for the
discretionary exception without resorting to the use of conclusory labels. The
government's need for immunity would be juxtaposed with the individual's need
for compensation, allowing the court to reach the most equitable result on the specific
facts in each particular dispute.
Even if the Ohio Supreme Court should decide that administrative decision
making merits greater protection, the same analysis could be utilized. In this case,
administrative decision making could receive a qualified immunity that would imbue
the questioned conduct with a rebuttable presumption of exculpation. A court could
only overcome this presumption through a considered and thoughtful balancing of
interests.
V. CONCLUSION
The waiver of immunity in the Ohio Court of Claims Act is consistent with the
actions other states have taken in restricting sovereign immunity. The Reynolds
decision expands this potential liability to include responsibility for all affirmative
state duties prescribed by statute. 140 Regardless of the policy questions raised, the
Ohio General Assembly ultimately will have to intervene if it decides that liability
should not accompany affirmative statutory duties placed on the state. In the absence
of legislative action, the Reynolds expansion of tort liability is appropriate and
consistent with principles of statutory construction applied to the present statutory
framework.
136. See Comment, Governmental Immunity and the Release of Dangerous Inmates from State Institutions: Can the
State Get Away with Murder?, 33 Bir. L. REv. 491, 494 (1984).
137. See Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 144 (1981), rev'd in part on rehearing, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.
1982).
138. See id. at 144-45.
139. See id.
140. Apparently, no liability will inure to the state without a violation of an express statutory command combined
with a belief that the purpose of the statute was to protect against the type of injury that actually occurred. See Juliano
v. State, 18 Ohio St. 3d 303, 304, 480 N.E.2d 817, 818 (1985).
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To preserve flexibility, the "discretionary exception" quagmire could best be
addressed through judicial interpretation. Proponents of governmental liability argue
that fairness and morality justify an expansive liability of the state for its own torts.
Conversely, proponents of limited immunity contend that effective governmental
administration demands some insulation from liability. Because of the difficulties the
courts have experienced in delineating exempt "discretionary" conduct, the Ohio
Supreme Court should seize the opportunity to forge a new standard. Although this
standard would grant absolute immunity to decisions by the state legislature and state
judiciary, the court could evaluate the vast majority of governmental functions-
departmental and administrative operations-through an extensive balancing of
interests. This approach would best effectuate the policies behind the need for a
limited exclusion to the tort liability of the State of Ohio.
Robert Northness

